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Abstract 
 
China’s local populations can be counted in two ways; by how many people have hukou 
household registration from each place and by how many people actually reside in each 
place. The counts differ by the non-hukou migrants – people that move from their place of 
registration – who have grown from fewer than five million when reform began in 1978 to 
over 200 million by 2010. For most of the first three decades of the reform era, the hukou 
count was used to produce per capita GDP figures. In coastal provinces the resident count is 
many millions more than the hukou count, while for migrant-sending provinces it is the 
reverse, creating a systematic and time-varying distortion in provincial GDP per capita. 
Moreover, a sharp discontinuity occurred when provinces recently switched from the hukou 
count to the resident count when reporting GDP per capita. A double-count also resulted 
because some provinces switched before others and initial resident counts were incomplete. 
This paper describes the changing definition of provincial populations in China and their 
impact on inequality in provincial GDP per capita. We show that much of the apparent 
increase in inter-provincial inequality disappears once a consistent series of GDP per resident 
is used. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen recounts how, as a nine-year-old boy, he saw unbelievably 
emaciated people dying in the streets during the 1943 Bengal famine (Sen, 1995).  These 
were the rural destitute, who had trekked from the countryside into the cities in search of 
food; by one estimate they numbered at least 100,000 in Calcutta alone (Sen, 1981). Yet just 
15 years later in the Great Leap famine in China, which killed at least 30 million people,1 
there was no similar trek by desperately hungry villagers seeking food in the cities. Instead, 
the strict controls on mobility in China under the hukou household registration system 
prevented the mass movement of people in search of food. So limited was movement that the 
excess mortality rate in one province – Anhui – was 17 times higher than that of a 
neighboring province, adding up to a difference of over six million excess deaths in Anhui 
between 1958 and 1961.2 
 
 Fast forward two decades to the beginning of China’s economic reform and the hukou 
system was largely intact. Every person in China in 1958 had been given either “agricultural” 
(nongye) or “non-agricultural” (fei nongye) hukou, to determine entitlements to state-
provided goods and services (regardless of location), which thereafter passed from mothers to 
children. In addition to hukou type, each person was categorized by their place of hukou 
registration (hukou suozaidi), which was their official and permanent residence in the eyes of 
the state (Chan, 2009). In the pre-reform era there was no freedom of movement, with all 
internal migration subject to approval from authorities at the destination, so the hukou 
operated much like an internal passport system (Chan and Zhang, 1999). But China’s 
population was maladjusted for the needs of a market economy, with too many people in the 
interior, and too few in the soon-to-be-booming coastal cities. So the non-hukou migrants 
emerged, people who moved to live and work somewhere other than their place of hukou 
registration – often hundreds of miles away.  
 
 China’s statistical system had no way to deal with the non-hukou migrants, so for 
most of the first three decades of the reform era, local GDP was divided by registered 
population rather than by resident population whenever per capita figures were reported. In 
other words, official data on provincial GDP per capita (and also for prefectures, counties 
and cities) were not based on the average number of residents but instead, on the household 
registered population. In coastal provinces the household registered population is many 
millions less than the resident population, while the reverse is true for migrant-sending inland 
provinces, so a systematic and time-varying distortion in provincial GDP per capita data was 
created. For example, at the time of the 2000 census, Guangdong province had a registered 
population of 75 million but residents numbered 86 million, so using registered population to 
                                                 
1 Smil (1999) estimates that 30 million starved to death between 1959 and 1961 and about the same 
number of births were lost or postponed. 
 
2 Specifically, from 1958 to 1961 there were 6.3 million excess deaths in Anhui, equivalent to 18.4 
percent of the population, but just 0.2 million excess deaths (one percent of the population) in 
neighboring Jiangxi (Yixin, 2010), even though these provinces share a 260 mile border.  Brown 
(2010) reports evidence that urban residents even smuggled food out of cities to their nearby but 
immobilized (by inflexible hukou) rural friends and relatives. 
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calculate GDP per capita gives a 15 percent overstatement. At finer spatial scales, such as for 
individual counties and cities, the error is much larger. The city of Shenzhen provides an 
outstanding example; its registered population was just over one million by the time of the 
2000 census but its residents numbered seven million, so per capita GDP was overstated by 
almost 600 percent in the official data of the time (Chan, 2009a). 
 
 Every year an avalanche of data comes out of China’s statistical system, with 
yearbooks for each province and for topics such as population, urbanization and the 
economy. The fact that these yearbooks regularly reported economic output of each province 
or sub-provincial area divided by a population concept that had no bearing to the actual 
number of people living in those areas has been routinely ignored by economists. As noted a 
decade ago by Rawski and Xiao (2001), few economists hesitated to utilize these standard 
yearbook data for their research. Instead, most debate by economists about economic 
statistics concerns the possible falsification of China’s GDP growth figures (Rawski, 2001, 
Chow, 2006) and the threat to time series comparisons from varying rules for constructing 
consumption data (Holz, 2004). Much less attention is paid to the simpler issue of how to 
count China’s local populations, despite the systematic distortion of per capita data created 
by using the wrong population figures. 
 
 In this paper we document these problems with China’s population data and highlight 
some implications, especially for the literature on inter-provincial and inter-regional (coastal-
inland) inequality. A general finding is that inequality rose sharply in the reform era (e.g. 
Fan, 1995; Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Huang et al., 2003; Fan and Sun, 2008; Li and Wei, 
2010) but this may be a statistical artefact caused by the unusual way that China has 
calculated GDP per capita. We also explore two problems related to the issue of the wrong 
population being used for per capita statistics. First, a sharp discontinuity occurred when 
some provinces recently switched from reporting GDP per registered population to GDP per 
resident. We show that this discontinuity causes a spurious trend change for measures of 
inter-provincial inequality, which coincides with initiatives to reduce inequality such as the 
West China Development Project (Fan and Sun, 2008), the Northeast China Revitalization 
Campaign (Zhang, 2008) and the Rise of Central China Plan (Lai, 2007). Second, there was a 
double-counting problem, since some provinces switched to reporting output per resident 
several years before others. Hence, the same person may have been in the denominator of 
GDP per capita for two different places at the same time; as a resident of one province and in 
the registered population of a province that was slow to switch to reporting output per 
resident. We estimate that up to 26 million people were included in this double-count. 
 
 These population errors and their impact on GDP per capita figures have been 
discussed in the geography literature for some time (Chan, 2007). But economists have 
largely ignored them, with just a single working paper devoted to this issue (Hoshino, 2011). 
In contrast to that previous study, we explore all of the problems with China’s local 
population data while Hoshinojust examines the problem of using GDP per registered 
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population.3 Furthermore, a common thread of much recent applied research on China has 
been to use data from sub-provincial levels, such as prefectures (Roberts et al, 2012) or 
counties (Banerjee, Duflo and Qian, 2012). Yet the problem of using the wrong population in 
per capita GDP statistics is much worse for smaller jurisdictions like counties, because many 
more people are defined as non-hukou migrants when working with smaller geographic units 
(Chan, 2012). Moreover, intercensal population figures for lower-level units only refer to the 
hukou registered population (Scharping, 2001). Consequently, there are no annual estimates 
of the resident population of small units like counties, so per capita GDP estimates for those 
small areas continue to be based on the wrong concept of local population. 
 
 
2.  Impacts on GDP per capita from Using the Wrong Population Concept 
 
The discrepancy between registered and resident population caused by the non-hukou 
migrants can only be clearly observed in years with either a microcensus or a full population 
census. The intercensal population data rely on the annual National Sample Survey on 
Population Changes, which appears to have understated non-hukou migrants, as we show 
below.  In terms of the years with more reliable data, China has carried out a national census 
in 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010, with a one percent microcensus in each of 1987, 1995 and 
2005. But even the time-trend from census and microcensus data is not fully consistent since 
the duration required to be defined as a resident changed (Scharping, 2001). The 1982 and 
1990 census counted non-hukou migrants as residents at their place of in-migration if they 
had lived there for more than one year, but each microcensus and the census in 2000 and 
2010 used a six-month stay for someone to be defined as a de facto resident.4  
 
 This inconsistency means that the number of non-hukou migrants will be understated 
in earlier years and the gap between GDP per resident and GDP per registered population will 
be smaller than if a consistent definition had been used. However our main point is not much 
undermined by this inconsistency, since the non-hukou migrants were a much smaller group 
in the 1980s, increasing by just 15 million (from 6.6 million in 1982 to 21.6 million in 1990 – 
both figures on a one year residency definition). In contrast, Chan (2012) reports that the 
number of non-hukou migrants increased by almost 100 million between the 1995 
microcensus and the 2000 census (both on a six month definition). So it is in the 1990s, and 
subsequently, that the trends in GDP per capita are most affected by the discrepancy between 
registered and resident population. 
 
                                                 
3  Moreover, the procedure used by Hoshino to develop an alternative to the officially reported GDP 
per registered population can be questioned because the way that the 1990 and 2000 census 
populations are spread over intercensal years suffers from the double-counting problem. 
 
4  Tsui (2007) is an example of a study that (wrongly) ignores this change in the length of stay 
required to be defined as a resident. Tsui projects age-specific population cohorts forward from the 
1982 and 1990 census and uses the gap between the actual figure in the next census and the 
projected figure for that year to estimate net in-migration and then spreads these evenly over the 
intercensal years. The six-month rule in the 2000 census gives more residents than the 12-month 
rule used in 1990, so this method will wrongly overstate the number of in-migrants in the 1990s. 
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 In Figure 1 we illustrate the trends in GDP per capita for six provinces, three migrant-
senders in the left column and three migrant-receivers in the right. 5 The solid line is the ratio 
of provincial GDP (in 2010 prices) to the population with hukou for that province. The 
dashed line shows GDP divided by the local resident population, as counted in the census or 
microcensus (six-month residency criteria).6 The GDP per resident of the migrant-sending 
provinces is about seven percent higher than GDP per registered population in 2005, and 
about 15 percent higher in 2010. The reason for the gap is that the permanent residents of the 
migrant-sending provinces are far fewer than the number of people with hukou registration 
for these provinces. In the case of Sichuan (including Chongqing) the difference in the two 
population counts is almost 15 million people by 2010, which is the number who left that 
province to live elsewhere – typically in the coastal cities. Yet for most of the economic 
reform period the officially reported GDP per capita figures for these inland provinces have 
included these missing people in their denominator. 
 
      The discrepancy between GDP per resident and GDP per registered population is much 
larger for the three migrant-receiving provinces shown in the right column of Figure 1. This 
reflects the funneling of migrants from many source provinces into just a few destinations, 
along the coast between Shanghai and Guangdong, and into the Beijing-Tianjin conurbation. 
For example, the registered and resident populations for Shanghai were 13.2 million and 16.7 
million in the 2000 census, so dividing GDP just by the registered population results in a 27 
percent upward bias in the per capita estimates. The gaps are even larger in 2010, at 55 
percent for Beijing, 23 percent for Guangdong and 63 percent for Shanghai. In terms of 
annual trend growth rates in GDP per capita, wrongly using the GDP per registered 
population would overstate growth rates for Beijing and Shanghai by about two percentage 
points per year. Since there is an understated growth rate for all the migrant sending 
provinces, the scope for distorted findings from studies that use uncorrected provincial GDP 
per capita figures should be apparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5  Beijing and Shanghai are province-level municipalities, along with Tianjin and (since 1997) 
Chongqing. Each one is included as a separate entity in province-level statistics. Each of these 
municipalities also includes agricultural populations. For example, Chongqing municipality had a 
registered population of 30.9 million in the 2000 census but the non-agricultural population in its 
city districts was just 3.8 million (Chan, 2007). 
 
6  The resident population for 2000 and 2005 is based on revised figures for those years produced by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) after the 2010 census. The revisions raised the estimated 
resident population of Shanghai in 2005 by six percent and lowered the estimate for 2000 by four 
percent, while for the other provinces shown in the figure there were almost no changes from the 
initial counts made in 2000 and 2005. 
7 
 
Figure 1: Trends in GDP per Registered and per Resident Population:  
Selected Provinces 
  
  
Notes: Chongqing included in Sichuan since they were one province until 1997. Values are in 2010 
prices using the GDP deflator for China provided by the World Bank. 
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 To illustrate the situation more generally across all provinces, the percentage 
understatement or overstatement of per capita GDP at the time of the 2005 microcensus is 
mapped in Figure 2. For the six provinces in the central interior of China with the largest 
understatement, on average GDP per capita was seven percent lower using registered rather 
than resident population. A group of six adjacent (but still interior) provinces had lower rates 
of understatement, averaging two percent. The next group of 13 provinces forms a band 
around the western, northern and northeastern periphery where a very slight upward bias, 
averaging just two percent, results from dividing GDP by the registered population. These 
provinces are neither important sources nor destinations for non-hukou migrants. The final 
six provinces are all main destinations for non-hukou migrants, with per capita GDP 
overstated by at least five percent (and averaging 15 percent). This final group of provinces 
includes those on the southeast coast (Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong) and the 
Beijing-Tianjin conurbation. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage Difference in GDP per Registered  
and per Resident Population: 2005 
 
 
 If the map in Figure 2 was redrawn for 2010 the patterns would be the same but the 
rates of over- and under-statement would be larger. Such a map could be considered 
misleading, however, because by 2009 all provinces in China had, finally, switched to 
reporting per capita GDP on a resident basis rather than using the misleading hukou-
registered population as the denominator. But the way in which this switch was implemented 
introduced a further set of problems with China’s local population data, which we describe in 
the next section.  
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3.  Discontinuities and Double-Counts 
 
The population denominator used for per capita economic statistics of many provinces 
switched abruptly from a registered population basis to a resident population basis. This 
change in statistical procedures occurred around 2005 for the largest migrant-senders and 
receivers, but the switchover date varied for other provinces. This switch in the denominator 
for GDP per capita statistics raises the apparent living standards in inland provinces while 
lowering it for coastal provinces, since it involves (correctly) accounting for the inter-
provincial non-hukou migrants. But the sudden switch made by the provinces with the largest 
migrant in-flows and out-flows creates a discontinuity in estimates of inter-provincial and 
coastal-inland inequality, at about the time that many government-led initiatives to reduce 
regional inequality were at their peak. It is likely that at least part of the claimed success from 
investment in central and western China in reducing the coastal-inland gap (Fan et al, 2011) 
was simply due to the timing of the change in the way that China’s economic statistics 
counted local populations.  
 
 In order to illustrate the sudden switch in the denominator of official GDP per capita 
estimates we chart time series of populations for the six provinces used in Figure 1. Two 
other features of China’s provincial population data are also highlighted by this exercise; 
first, the reports of the resident population in the Statistical Yearbooks appear unreliable for 
most years, and second, the most plausible time series of resident population for each 
province have only been available since 2011. Consequently, research that uses provincial 
population estimates that were published before 2011 and which relies on a concept of 
resident population – as most per capita economic statistics should – is likely to be distorted. 
 
To explain each of these points fully, four time series are needed for each province: 
 
• GDP implied population - the population values underlying reported GDP per capita 
figures. We derived these annual average population estimates by dividing current 
reported provincial GDP by current reported provincial GDP per capita.7  
• Registered population - the year-end registered population (hukou suozaidi) for each 
province, as reported in China Population Statistical Yearbook 1991-2006, China 
Population and Employment Statistical Yearbook 2007-2010, and China Health Statistical 
Yearbook 2011. 
• Resident (initial) population - the estimated year-end resident population, reported each 
year in China Population Statistical Yearbook 1991-2006, China Population and 
Employment Statistical Yearbook 2007-2010, and China Statistical Yearbook 2011. In 
years without a census or microcensus, this resident count comes from the annual National 
Sample Survey on Population Changes and from the census data otherwise. 
• Resident (revised) population - the annual average of the resident population in previous 
years back to 1990 that was released by NBS in 2011in the statistical yearbooks for each 
                                                 
7  Holz (2004) uses the same approach to derive the urban and rural populations that are implied by 
household consumption statistics. Our particular sources are the Comprehensive Statistical Data 
and Materials on 50 Years of New China, the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy 
2001-2011, and the historical sections of the 2011 edition of the Statistical Yearbook for each 
province. 
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province, derived by dividing current reported provincial GDP by current reported 
provincial GDP per capita. This revision uses the results from the 2010 census and 
attempts to smooth out discrepancies in the time series of resident population. 
 
 For each of the six provinces shown in Figure 3, the GDP implied population tracks 
very closely with the registered population for the province from 1990 to 2004 (Beijing and 
Shanghai) or to slightly earlier (Guangdong and Sichuan – 2003; Henan – 2002; Anhui – 
2001). There is then a sharp upward jump in the implied population in Beijing and Shanghai 
and a sharp downward drop in the implied population for the three migrant-sending 
provinces. For Beijing and Shanghai the population jump is equivalent to over 30 percent of 
the previous year population, while for the three provinces shedding population the decline is 
equivalent to four percent of the previous year population. After this abrupt change the 
implied population then closely tracks either or both of the two resident population time 
series. The only province where the switch from registered to resident population time series 
takes more than one year is Guangdong, where it is spread over the years from 2001 to 2005.  
 
 The next feature of the provincial population data shown in Figure 3 is the volatility 
of the time series of initial estimates of the resident population. The three migrant-sending 
provinces all show sharp dips in the time series in 2000 and then sharp declines in 2005 that 
are not reversed. For the migrant-receivers, the estimated number of residents spikes in 2000 
and shows rapid rises again in 2010, and also in 2005 for Guangdong. For each province the 
year(s) that do not fit with the trend for the surrounding years, or that mark a shift to a 
different time trend all correspond with the timing of either a census or microcensus. For the 
intercensal years the resident population count comes from the National Sample Survey on 
Population Changes, which is just a 0.1 percent sample. It appears that this sample is not able 
to adequately cover non-hukou migrants, compared with the more extensive efforts of the 
census and microcensus.  
 
 
Figure 3: Trends in Implied, Registered and Resident Population: Selected Provinces  
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Source: Author’s calculations from the sources described in text. For other notes see Figure 1. 
 
 
 In order to test our contention that the initial estimates of resident population in the 
Statistical Yearbooks understated non-hukou migrants, we compared the 2000 census counts 
with what the resident population would have been estimated as in that year from the trend 
for the two surrounding years. For example, in Anhui the census count of residents was 59.9 
million but the trend line joining the 1999 and 2001 Yearbook figures implies that there 
would have been 62.9 million residents in 2000, if estimated in the same way as in the 
surrounding years. We then regressed this imputed yearbook population for 2000 on the 
census count of the resident population in 2000: 
 
yearbook = β0 + β1census + ε 
 
separately for migrant-sending provinces and for migrant-receiving provinces.  
 
 The results were that β1senders=1.023 while β1receivers=0.953 and the null hypothesis that 
these coefficients are equal is clearly rejected (t=2.20). In other words, the method used to 
form the estimates of resident population that were reported in the Statistical Yearbooks for 
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non-census years overstates the population of migrant-sending provinces and understates it 
for receiving provinces. This pattern could only result from underestimating the number of 
non-hukou migrants. Thus even if economists had been concerned that the official GDP per 
capita figures relied on a conceptually incorrect denominator – the registered population – 
and had attempted to adjust them by dividing by the reported resident population, the data 
available would not have allowed them to make a correct adjustment, except in census years. 
 
 The third feature of the provincial population data shown in Figure 3 is that the most 
plausible time series of resident population for each province have only been available since 
2011. These data are shown by the dashed line labeled “Resident (revised)” and they 
represent the attempt by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to use the latest census 
counts to correct the initial estimates of the resident population in each province.8 In contrast 
to the initial estimates, reported year-by-year in each province’s Statistical Yearbook, which 
are quite volatile between census and non-census years, the revised estimates smooth the time 
series. Nevertheless, we must stress that these are only estimates and it will never be known 
for certain what the annual resident population of China’s provinces was for most of the first 
three decades of economic reform.  
 
 The final idiosyncratic feature of China’s provincial population data, which is not 
apparent from Figure 3, is that a few provinces had been reporting output per resident rather 
than output per registered population from as far back as 1990. The same person can be 
counted as a resident of one province and in the registered population of another province, so 
poor coordination between provinces in when they switched to reporting output per resident 
creates scope for a double-counting problem. The year in which each province switched to 
reporting GDP per resident is shown in Table 1. We determine this date using charts like 
those in Figure 1, but for all provinces, since there is no explicit discussion of the (changing) 
population basis for GDP per capita calculations in contemporary statistical documents. The 
registered and resident population for each province, as counted in the 2010 census is also 
reported in Table 1, along with the number of non-hukou migrants (positive for in-migrants 
and negative for out-migrants) and this number as a percentage of the resident population. In 
unreported regressions we examined whether the switch date for each province was related to 
whether they were a migrant-sender or receiver, to the number of their non-hukou migrants 
and to the size of their total population. There were no clear relationships to explain why the 
statistical authorities in some provinces switched to reporting GDP per resident much earlier 
than did the authorities in other provinces. 
 
  
                                                 
8  The 2010 population census (and the Second Economic Census, conducted in 2008) provides 
corrected endpoints for recalculating trends in GDP and GDP per capita. This “new trend” can 
then be used to revise previous annual estimates. Specifically, annual deviations from a “historical 
trend” (based on the previous Yearbook data that did not benefit from the latest census results) are 
applied to the new trend. Wu (2007) provides details for GDP revisions. 
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Table 1: Year of First Using Resident Population in Official GDP per capita Estimates 
 
 
Province 
Registered 
Population 
(2010 mil) 
Resident 
Population 
(2010 mil) 
Non-hukou 
migrants 
(2010 mil) 
Migrants as 
% of 
residents 
Year of 
GDP switch 
to residents 
 Shanghai 14.1 23.0 8.9 39% 2005 
 Beijing 12.6 19.6 7.0 36% 2005 
 Tianjin 9.9 13.0 3.1 24% 2005 
 Guangdong 85.2 104.4 19.2 18% 2001 
 Zhejiang 47.5 54.5 7.0 13% 2001 
 Jiangsu 74.7 78.7 4.0 5% 1990 
 Fujian 35.3 36.9 1.6 4% 2000 
 Shanxi 34.7 35.7 1.0 3% 1991 
 Liaoning 42.5 43.7 1.2 3% 1990 
 Qinghai 5.5 5.6 0.1 2% 1990 
 Tibet 2.9 3.0 0.1 2% 2000 
 Yunnan 45.3 46.0 0.7 2% 1991 
 Xinjiang 21.6 21.9 0.2 1% 1990 
 Jilin 27.2 27.5 0.2 1% 1997 
 Inner Mongolia 24.5 24.7 0.2 1% 1991 
 Shandong 95.4 95.9 0.5 1% 1997 
 Heilongjiang 38.4 38.3 -0.1 0% 1990 
 Hebei 73.0 71.9 -1.0 -1% 1991 
 Ningxia 6.4 6.3 -0.1 -2% 2001 
 Hainan 9.0 8.7 -0.3 -3% 2003 
 Shaanxi 38.7 37.4 -1.4 -4% 1992 
 Jiangxi 46.9 44.6 -2.3 -5% 1990 
 Gansu 27.1 25.6 -1.5 -6% 1995 
 Hubei 61.5 57.3 -4.2 -7% 2005 
 Hunan 70.7 65.7 -5.0 -8% 2001 
 Sichuan 90.0 80.4 -9.6 -12% 2004 
 Chongqing 33.0 28.8 -4.2 -15% 2004 
 Anhui 68.3 59.6 -8.7 -15% 2002 
 Henan 108.0 94.1 -13.9 -15% 2003 
 Guangxi 53.3 46.1 -7.2 -16% 2003 
 Guizhou 41.9 34.8 -7.1 -20% 2008 
Notes: Year of GDP switch to residents is the year in which official average population became 
resident population (before which it was registered population). Provinces are sorted according to the 
migrant percentage. 
 
  
 In Figure 4 we show the scope of this double-counting problem, by adding up the 
population of each province for the 1990-2010 years. We note in advance that the national 
sum of the resident population should be less than the national sum of the hukou registered 
population, since the People’s Liberation Army and any Chinese with foreign permanent 
residency are not counted as residents but do have household registration status. Yet between 
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1990 and 2005 the resident population obtained by summing across all provinces (shown by 
the solid line) exceeded the registered population (shown by the dotted line). The excess 
number of people counted as residents was especially apparent between 2000 and 2004, when 
it averaged 24 million people (with a maximum of 26 million). The source of this excess is 
that what was called ‘resident’ in many provinces was, in fact, registered population, which 
exceeded their true number of residents. In other words, some people were counted as 
residents in the province of their hukou registration and were counted again, as residents in 
the provinces that they actually lived in. Consequently it would have been no simple matter 
for economists to abandon the officially reported GDP per registered population and calculate 
their own estimates of GDP per resident, since the data on the resident population were so 
distorted. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Double-Count in Resident Population (Summation over all Provinces) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the sources described in text.
 
 
 The final population time series shown in Figure 4 is for the sum of each province’s 
revised resident population, shown by the dashed line. These revised counts use the results 
from the 2010 census to correct the initial estimates of resident population in each province. 
Specifically, the trend-deviation interpolation approach (described in footnote 8) was used by 
the NBS in 2011 to revise previous annual estimates of GDP and GDP per capita, giving an 
implied annual average of the resident population for each province. For most provinces this 
revision went back as far as 1990, but for nine provinces only a shorter time series was 
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revised.9 Therefore, for those nine provinces we use the same approach as the NBS to 
backdate the revised counts of the resident population to 1990. It is the sum across provinces 
of these revised counts which are shown in Figure 4 and they almost completely eliminate the 
double-count problem. Whereas the double-count in the year-by-year initial estimates of 
resident population averaged 17 million over 1990 to 2005, in the revised series the average 
double-count is just one million. Still, even the revised series only obeys the expected pattern 
of being less than the sum of the registered counts since 2006, so it is only for the most recent 
years that there can be any great confidence in the estimates of the resident population of 
China’s provinces. 
 
4. Impacts of Population Errors on Trends in Inter-provincial and Inter-regional 
 Inequality 
 
Despite the shaky foundations created by China’s official data using a population concept 
that had no bearing to the actual number of people living in each province, a large literature 
that relies on reports of provincial GDP per capita has already emerged. In this section we 
show how the population errors described above may have distorted some of the conclusions 
reached by one strand of this literature – that related to inter-provincial and inter-regional 
(coastal-inland) inequality. In Table 2 we survey studies published in the last 15 years that 
use provincial GDP per capita as their economic indicator for analyzing trends in regional 
inequality. Only four of the 14 studies make any adjustment to the data from the Statistical 
Yearbooks to account for the distortions from using registered population as the 
denominator.10 Findings from the studies that rely on unadjusted data are potentially 
misleading, at least for the period since 1990 when the number of non-hukou migrants greatly 
increased. Even when the potential bias from using GDP per registered population is 
recognized, the adjustment procedures can be questioned, not least because they all lacked 
the results from the latest 2010 census that support the most plausible revisions of resident 
population estimates.11 
 
 To illustrate the potential bias in previous studies we calculate three of the most 
commonly used statistics of inter-provincial inequality – the Theil index, the coefficient of 
                                                 
9  The provinces and their earliest year with revised data are: Zhejiang (2000), Jiangxi (2000), Henan 
(2003), Hubei (2000), Hunan (2002), Guangxi (1998), Sichuan, including Chongqing (2000), 
Guizhou (2006) and Gansu (2006). 
 
10  China occasionally releases compilations of data from the Statistical Yearbooks covering two or 
more decades, typically with titles of “20 years …”, “40 years …” but these do not show any 
consistent adjustment to the population data initially published year-by-year so studies using these 
compilations are counted in the group using unadjusted data. 
 
11  Specific concerns with the adjustments of Hoshino (2011) and Tsui (2007) are listed in footnotes 3 
and 4. The Fan and Sun (2008) adjustment is to replace census estimates of resident population 
with the surrounding year estimates from the Yearbooks, while the discussion of Figures 3 and 4 
above suggests that the opposite procedure should be used. The Chan and Wang (2008) paper does 
not adjust for the double-count issue shown in Figure 4. 
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variation (CoV), and the Gini coefficient.12 We compare the time series for each statistic 
using three different population denominators to calculate GDP per capita for each province: 
 
• GDP implied population 
• Registered population 
• Resident (revised) population 
 
 Each of these three population time series has been previously described in the 
discussion of Figures 3 and 4.13 The revisions to the resident population estimates only go 
back as far as 1990 (by the NBS for 21 provinces and by us for the remaining nine) so this 
comparison is limited to the 21 years from 1990 to 2010. To put this starting date into 
context, from the beginning of economic reform in 1978 until 1990, inter-provincial 
inequality in China fell rapidly, with trend annual rates of decline of 4.6 percent (Theil), 3.9 
percent (CoV) and 0.5 percent (Gini).14 This falling inequality resulted from the early 
decollectivization of agriculture, which saw incomes in rural provinces close some of the gap 
with the three richest urban provinces (Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin). Also, at the start of the 
reform period, the soon-to-be-booming southeast coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian and 
Zhejiang were not even in the top one-third of provinces (ranking 10th, 23rd and 16th 
according to GDP per capita in 1978), so the tremendous growth that they soon experienced 
had an equalizing impact.15 Therefore in our illustration of the impact of population errors on 
regional inequality trends, the starting point happens to be the most equal year in the reform 
era. 
 
 For all three of the inequality statistics shown in Figure 5, the 1990 to 2000 trend 
using the GDP implied population (shown by the solid line) is almost identical to that using 
registered population (shown by the dotted line). This is unsurprising since most large 
provinces were still reporting GDP per capita on a registered population basis during these 
years (Table 1). Yet, while inequality in the officially reported GDP per capita was rapidly 
rising in the decade from 1990 (at a three percent annual rate in the case of the Theil index) it 
was largely divorced from the (correct) trend shown when GDP per capita is calculated using 
the revised resident population estimates (the dashed line in Figure 5). In fact, the apparent 
                                                 
12 The Theil index is: )ln())((
1
μμ wjmj wjjw yyPpT ∑ ==  where m=30 provinces (Sichuan and Chongqing 
merged), pj is the population of the jth province, P is overall population,  ywj is the GDP per capita 
of the jth province, and μ is the overall population-weighted mean of GDP per capita for all 
provinces. The (weighted) coefficient of variation is: .))((
1
2 μμ∑ = −= mj wjj yPpVoC  The Gini 
coefficient is: ( ) .2 2
1 1 ∑∑ ∑= = −= μimi mj wjwiji pyyppG  
 
13  We do not need to use the “Resident (initial) population” as an alternative denominator for GDP 
per capita in this illustration because we have already shown that these initial estimates of the 
resident population were unreliable (Figure 4).  
 
14  Trend rates are estimated from a semi-logarithmic regression on time, and are statistically 
significant at the one percent level (Theil and CoV) and the eight percent level (Gini) using 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors with a single 
lag. The provincial GDP per capita data underlying the inequality statistics are all based on 
registered population from 1978 to 1990. 
15  China had only 29 provinces until 1988. 
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rise in inter-provincial inequality between 1990 and 2000, when using the Theil index 
calculated from the official data of the time, is 66 percent greater than the actual rise, based 
on the revised resident series. For the CoV and the Gini, the overstatement created by using 
uncorrected Yearbook data for GDP per capita is 94 percent and 38 percent, as of the year 
2000. If there had been no change in the basis of GDP per capita calculations, the apparent 
trend in inter-provincial inequality would have carried on rising strongly (for example, there 
is a 1.4 percent per annum trend rise in the Theil index when using registered population over 
2001-10). But, in fact, inter-provincial inequality returns almost exactly to its starting point 
by 2010 (for the Theil index; the CoV is slightly lower and the Gini slightly higher than their 
1990 values) in the time series based on the corrected data. Hence, if GDP per registered 
population had continued to be used as the official data, all of the apparent rise in inequality 
would have been measurement error. 
 
 
Figure 5: Inter-Provincial Inequality in GDP per capita With Various Denominators 
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 The other feature illustrated by Figure 5 is the apparent change in the trend in inter-
provincial inequality, when using the GDP implied population series. From 1990 to 2003 the 
trend annual rate of increase was 2.9 percent (for the Theil index; 1.5 percent for the CoV and 
1.6 percent for the Gini), but this then sharply reversed, to decline at a rate of 5.6 percent per 
year (3.8 percent using CoV and 2.3 percent for the Gini) over 2003-2010. But rather than 
reflecting any major change in the true situation in 2003, this is an artefact resulting from the 
switch to reporting per capita GDP on a resident basis. Since inequality in GDP per resident 
is considerably lower than inequality in GDP per registered population, this switch in 
statistical procedure automatically reduces measured inequality in the officially reported GDP 
per capita without any underlying change necessarily occurring in the economy in that year. 
In fact, in both the registered-based and resident-based series in Figure 5, the turning point in 
the inequality trend does not occur until 2005, which happens to be the year that the coastal 
provinces reached their maximum share of GDP. Whether the reduction in inequality 
thereafter is from lagged effects of the investments into western and inland China (Fan et al, 
2011) rather than due to the contraction in the export-oriented coastal provinces as a result of 
the Global Financial Crisis is an open question. 
 
 A reasonable summary of the patterns in the inter-provincial inequality time series, 
based on the most plausible revised population estimates, is that there was a largely stable 
pattern of inter-provincial inequality between 1993 and 2004. Over those years, the average 
annual deviation was just four percent of the 1993-04 mean (for the Theil index). The only 
two occasions of notable change in inter-provincial inequality were from 1990-93, when 
there was a sharp increase in inequality; and from 2005-2010, when that initial increase was 
more than fully reversed. Recalling that the 12 years prior to 1990 had witnessed an almost 
continuous decline in inter-provincial inequality (reducing the Theil index from 0.16 to 0.08), 
the solitary three year episode of rising inequality from 1990-93 – which lifted the Theil 
index back to just over 0.10 – hardly qualifies as strong support for the claim from the 
literature that regional inequality has risen in the reform era. 
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 Our final illustration of how apparent trends may be affected by the switch from 
reporting GDP per registered population to GDP per resident is for a regional decomposition 
of inequality. Several papers in the literature group China’s provinces into regions and 
examine the between-region inequality trends. We carry out a similar exercise for the coastal-
inland comparison, using the Theil index (which decomposes exactly, unlike the Gini 
coefficient). In Figure 6 we show the time series for the between-group Theil index and it is 
apparent that inequality between the coast and inland provinces rises, by about 0.04 points, 
from 1990 to around 2005.16 But from 2000 to 2005, while the time series of inequality using 
the GDP implied denominator is detaching from the registered population series and moving 
toward the resident-based series, this movement makes it seem that there is a largely 
unchanged between-group component. Specifically, the increase from 2000 to  2005 in the 
GDP implied time series in Figure 6 is just ten percent, versus a 36 (27) percent increase 
when inequality is measured using the registered (resident) population.  
 
 
Figure 6: Coastal-Inland Inequality With Various Denominators for GDP per capita 
 
 
Source: Decomposition of Theil index into within-group and between-group components. 
 
 
 In terms of policy evaluation, the most active period of state intervention to close the 
regional gaps had already run its course by 2005, by which time more than 1 trillion Yuan 
(US$180 billion) of state-led infrastructural investment had been placed in western China 
(Yao, 2009). Some authors have suggested that a leveling off of the coastal-inland gap in this 
period reflects the good effects of these interventions (Fan et al, 2011). But an alternative 
                                                 
16  The identical time series, but rescaled, would be shown if we examined the ratio of mean GDP per 
capita in the coastal provinces to mean GDP per capita in the inland provinces. This ratio starts at 
just over 1.6 in 1990, peaks at 2.2 in 2005 and was back below 1.9 by 2010.We group Hainan, 
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, Tainjin and Beijing together 
as the coastal provinces. 
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explanation is that the apparent leveling off over those years is just an artefact created as the 
population series used to denominate GDP per capita progressively switched from one based 
on registered population to one based on resident population which involved switching from 
a higher trending inequality time series to a lower trending one, creating an apparently static 
period. 
 
5.  Conclusions and Implications 
 
We have shown how changes over time in the population denominator used for China’s 
provincial GDP per capita statistics may distort understanding of recent trends in regional 
inequality. Much of the apparent trend increase, and change in trend in 2003, disappear once 
proper account is taken of non-hukou migrants, so that GDP per resident is calculated 
correctly for each province of China over 1990-2010. Putting the corrected data for the last 
two decades into the context of the entire reform era, the changing pattern of inter-provincial 
inequality can be thought of as composing four episodes, only one of which involves rising 
inequality. From 1978 until 1990 inter-provincial inequality declined almost continuously; 
about one-third of this decline was reversed over the next three years; then a decade of little 
change in inequality was ended by a sharp one-year rise in 2005 but even with that rise, 
inequality had returned to only two-thirds of its starting value in 1978; finally, inter-
provincial inequality fell sharply after 2005, so that by 2010 it was right back at the low 
levels previously seen in 1990. Thus the only sustained episode of rising inequality in the 
reform era was from 1990 to 1993, representing just three out of 33 years since liberalization 
began.  
 
 The three errors in China’s local population data described here – using registered 
population as a denominator, the abrupt and uncoordinated switch to using a resident 
denominator, and the double-count introduced by the partial and inconsistent way that 
residents were counted by different provinces in any given year – are also likely to bias 
econometric research using the published data on provincial GDP per capita. The errors are 
correlated with the levels and growth rates of GDP per capita, since the non-hukou migrants 
were moving into richer, faster growing provinces, and the errors are increasing over time (at 
least until each province switches to reporting GDP per resident). In contrast to random 
(classical) errors, which cause no bias when just in the dependent variable and which always 
attenuate the coefficient on a single error-ridden explanatory variable, the effects of these 
errors will be more complex and pernicious. Moreover, the main correction used by 
economists for measurement error bias – instrumental variables (IV) – is inconsistent when 
errors are correlated with true values (Black, Berger and Scott, 2000), while bounding 
estimates based on reverse regression are unlikely to be effective in practice (Gibson and 
Kim, 2010). The recent trend in applied research on China to use data from smaller spatial 
units is especially vulnerable to the threat posed by these errors. 
 
 Finally, we acknowledge that we have only considered errors in the population 
denominator for GDP per capita, while leaving possible errors in the numerator 
unchallenged. In fact, in 2006 and 2009, the National Bureau of Statistics retrospectively 
adjusted provincial GDP for 1993-2003 and 2005-2008 according to the results from China’s 
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First and Second Economic Census in 2004 and 2009. In order to cleanly describe the effects 
of the population errors, we chose to work with the originally published GDP data rather than 
use the recently revised series. However, the patterns we find, of mostly falling inequality 
that returns to levels seen in 1990, are also apparent if we had used the revised GDP data for 
the numerator. For the same reason of wanting to cleanly identify the effect of population 
errors while not introducing auxiliary variations, we did not adjust for spatial differences in 
prices despite richer provinces in China being more expensive places to live, especially in 
urban areas (Brandt and Holz, 2006). In other words, there would be less apparent inter-
provincial inequality if we were to recast our analysis using spatially real prices; however, 
spatial deflators are not available for years since 2004. The task of generating reliable data for 
local areas of China that reflect appropriate concepts in terms of populations, prices and 
nominal variables will be an on-going task for the research community. 
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Table 2. Selected Recent Studies of Inter-Provincial and Inter-Regional Inequality in China that Use Provincial GDP per capita as an Indicator
Authors Period Statistic(s) Scale Key patterns in inequality (in reform era) Population data sources used in GDP per capita  denominator
Duncan and Tian (1999)* 1952–95 CV InterP, IntraP Rose in the first half of the 1990s China Statistical Yearbook, Provincial Statistical Yearbook
Ying (1999) 1978–94 Theil InterP Declined until 1990; then increased 40 Years (a); China Statistical Yearbook, 1985-94
Fujita and Hu (2001) 1985–94 CV, Theil InterP Declined in the 1980s; increased  in 1990s China Statistical Yearbook
Cai et al. (2001) 1978–99 CV, Theil InterP Declined between 1978 and 1990 but increased since 
around 1990
50 Years
Lu and Wang (2002)* 1978–98 CV, GINI, Theil InterP, 3 regions, 
R/U
Declined from 1978 to 1990 and then increased steadily China Statistical Yearbook, 40 Years (a) and 20 Years
Huang et al. (2003) 1991–01 GINI 7 regions Increased China Statistical Yearbook
Kanbur and Zhang (2005) 1952–00 GINI InterP, 
R/U coastal-inland
Increased sharply and steadily since 1984 1952-1978: 40 Years (b); 1978-2000: 50 Years, Agricultural 50 
Years, China Statistical Yearbook, China Rural Statistical Yearbook
Xu and Li (2006) 1978-04 GINI InterP A slight decline beginning around 2003 Provincial Statistical Yearbooks
Tsui (2007) 1952–99 Theil InterP Upward trend in first half of 1990s, results based on official 
data show sharp increase since 1995 while author's adjusted 
data show no change
1952-1981: 50 Years and Provincial Statistical Yearbooks; 1982-
1999: extrapolation from 1982, 1990 and 2000 population censuses
Liu and Zhang (2007) 1952-06 CV, GINI InterP Declined in 2000-2001 and 2003-2006 1952-1998: 50 Years; 1999-2006: China Statistical Yearbook
Fan and Sun (2008) 1978–06 CV, Theil, GINI InterP, 
3 regions, InterR
Declined in 1980s; increased in1990s, then stabilized 1978-2004: 55 Years; 2005-2006 China Statistical Yearbook; 
extrapolation: replacing 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 census and sample 
survey population by averaging prior and subsequent year annual 
yearbook population
Chan and Wang (2008) 1990-06 CV InterP Rose in the first half of the 1990s; levelled off and stable 
since 1995 due to impact of long-distance migration
1990-2000: Benchmark of population censuses and sample survey 
in 1990, 2000 and 1995; 2000-2006: China Statistical Abstract
Li and Wei (2010) 1978-07 CV, Theil, GINI InterP, 3 regions, 
InterR
Declined in 1980s; increased since 1990; declined since 
2004
China Data Online
Hoshino (2011) 1979-09 CV, Theil, GINI, 
MLD, A(e)
InterP, 3 regions, 
IntraR
Declined in 1980s; increased in 1990s, especially if using 
registered population as denominator; stable or declining 
since 2004, depending on choice of population denominator
1978-1981: China Population Statistical Yearbook 1990; 1982-
2005: extrapolation from 1982, 1990, 2000 population censuses and 
2005 population sample survey; 2006-2009: China Statistical 
Abstract 2010
Details for Population Source Data:
Agricultural 50 Years = National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Comprehensive Agricultural Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (Xin Zhongguo Wushinian Nongye Tongji Ziliao Huibian ). Beijing: China 
Statistical Publishing House (2000).
55 Years = National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004 (Xin Zhongguo Wushiwunian Tongji Ziliao Huibian ). Beijing: Statistics Press of China, 2005.
Notes:  *=also uses indicators other than per capita  GDP. CV = coefficient of variation, MLD = mean logrithimic deviation, A(e)=Atkinson inequality index. InterP = interprovincial; IntraP = intraprovincial; 
InterR = interregional, IntraR = intraregional; R/U = rural/urban.
20 Years = National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 1998. The twenty years of spectacular achievements. Beijing: Statistics Press of China.
40 Years (a) = Hsueh T-T., Li, Q. and Liu, S. (Eds). 1993. China’s provincial statistics 1949-1989. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
40 Years (b) = National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Historical Statistical Materials for Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Municipalities 1949-1989 (Quanguo Gesheng Zizhiqu Zhixiashi Lishi Tongji Ziliao Huibian ). 
Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House (1990).
50 Years = National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (Xin Zhongguo Wushinian Tongji Ziliao Huibian ). Beijing: China Statistical Publishing (1999).
